Strangulating Hearsay: The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule by Yasser, Ray
University of Tulsa College of Law
TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works
1980
Strangulating Hearsay: The Residual Exceptions to
the Hearsay Rule
Ray Yasser
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
11 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 587 (1980).
STRANGULATING HEARSAY:' THE





The residual or "catch-all" hearsay exceptions contained in
the Federal Rules of Evidence2 permit a trial judge, under certain
circumstances, to admit hearsay that does not fit within a specific
exception to the hearsay rule. The courts continue to vary widely in
their construction and implementation of these new exceptions.
This article explores the history and background of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, particularly the residual exceptions, catalogs
the relevant cases, and concludes with suggestions for the proper
scope of the exceptions.3
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE'
The American Law Institute (ALL) made the first major effort
to revise, modernize, and structure the law of evidence, including
the rules on the use of hearsay. Out of its work, begun in 1936,
emerged the 1942 draft of the Model Code of Evidence. Unlike its
approach in other areas of the law, the ALL made no attempt to
"restate" the law of evidence, apparently believing that a recapitu-
lation would not be as useful as a thoughtful revision.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa; B.A., University of Delaware, 1971;
J.D., Duke University, 1974.
1. Professor Tribe has already "triangulated" hearsay. See Tribe, Triangulating Hear-
say, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974). It is now time for hearsay to be strangulated.
2. FED. R. EvID. 803 and 804.
3. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975. Act of January 2,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926.
4. Much of the discussion that follows is from the unpublished notes of Dean Frank T.
Read, currently Dean of Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis and formerly
Dean of The University of Tulsa College of Law. Some of the history is documented in a
letter from Albert Jenner, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence to Judge
Albert B. Mars, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 173-81 (1969).
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The drafters of the Model Code of Evidence departed from the
common law in their approach to hearsay. They drafted a sweeping
new exception to the hearsay rule that provided for admission of
hearsay that did not fit any specific exception. This catch-all ex-
ception was qualified and safeguarded by other provisions that lim-
ited its application to declarations by persons with personal knowl-
edge and empowered the trial judge to exclude hearsay whenever
its probative value was outweighed by the likelihood of waste of
time, prejudice, confusion, or unfair surprise. The traditional ex-
ceptions were retained but liberalized.
In 1949, the ALI referred its Model Code to the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for study
and redrafting. Their hope was that the Model Code could serve as
a basis for a uniform code of evidence for all states. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Uniform Rules of Evidence based upon the Model Code. The Uni-
form Rules did not go quite as far in its treatment of hearsay as the
Model Code. The drafters of the Uniform Rules retained the tradi-
tional exceptions, but liberalized them by giving power to judges to
exclude hearsay when its value was outweighed by the dangers of
wasted time, prejudice, confusion, or surprise. This treatment of
hearsay, while narrower than that in the Model Code, nevertheless
did empower judges to admit much needed and highly reliable
evidence.
Although the Uniform Rules received widespread favorable
comment from the bench, the bar, and the academic community,
there was little legislative response. In the first decade after its
drafting, the Uniform Rules were approved by the American Bar
Association and the American Law Institute, but adopted only by
the Virgin Islands. The Uniform Rules did, however, provoke dis-
cussion of the need for a modem code or law of evidence and
demonstrated the feasibility of codifying workable rules.
Even though it became apparent that the Uniform Rules had
no chance of being enacted as uniform legislation in all states,
strong pressure still existed for the adoption of uniform rules.
Those in favor of reforming the rules of evidence felt that the vast
improvement in the federal courts from the use of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Admiralty was still in-
complete because of the courts' inconsistent evidentiary rules.
Many felt that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure needed to be
supplemented with companion rules of evidence that would be an
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essential part of the trial procedure.
In 1941, Professor Thomas Green of Harvard suggested that
the Supreme Court should promulgate rules of evidence for all fed-
eral court trials under The Rulemaking Act of 1934, as it had done
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 1957, sixteen years
after Professor Green's suggestion, the judicial conferences of both
the Third and Sixth Circuits recommended that uniform rules of
evidence for all federal courts be drafted and propounded. In 1958,
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted a
resolution calling for uniform federal rules of evidence.
Responding to this strong desire for reform, Chief Justice War-
ren appointed a special committee on evidence in 1961. With Pro-
fessor Green appointed as reporter, the committee unanimously
concluded that, (1) the rules of evidence of federal courts should be
improved, and (2) uniform rules for the entire federal system were
both feasible and advisable. Based on the conclusions of the com-
mittee, Chief Justice Warren appointed a new drafting committee
to provide a draft of the uniform rules by 1968. The committee be-
gan work in 1965 and made its first preliminary report in 1968. Af-
ter reworking, the report was first published as a "Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates." 5
On Monday, November 20, 1972,' the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence were approved by the Supreme Court, with Justice Douglas
dissenting, and authorized for transmittal to Congress. Congress,
rather than allowing the Proposed Rules to become law, passed an
act on March 30, 19731 requiring specific Congressional approval.
After one and a half years of debate, Congress gave its approval
and the rules took effect on July 1, 1975.8
Ill. THE DEBATE OVER THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTIONS
The 1969 Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence
contained a general provision that: "A statement is not excluded
by the hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances
5. Preliminary draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
6. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
7. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat 9. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1973).
8. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926.
19801
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy. . ." Sub-
sequently, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States modified the 1969
draft in an attempt to more appropriately balance the need for pre-
dictability of evidentiary rules with the need for flexibility. The
Committee recognized the dangers of unbridled judicial discretion
and the need for definite rules, but also understood and appreci-
ated that trial judges must have broad discretion. The Committee
finally formulated a residual exception that provided, in pertinent
part, that statements not specifically covered by an articulated ex-
ception to the hearsay rule were admissible if they had "compara-
ble circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."'' 0 It was this
residual exception that provided the grist for the congressional
debates.
The House considered the rules first and referred them to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, which in turn referred them to
the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice." The Committee report
recommended that the residual exceptions be deleted.' 2 The Com-
mittee pointed out that proposed Rule 102, which provided that all
rules should be construed "to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined,"' 3
was a sufficient grant of judicial discretion to innovate should the
need arise.'4 Moreover, the Committee noted, the residual excep-
tions would inject an undesirable amount of uncertainty into the
law of evidence and would consequently impair the ability of prac-
titioners to predict trial court rulings.'5 The House approved the
9. Preliminary draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969). See 4 J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENcE 803 (2d ed. 1979).
10. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
11. K. REDDEN AND S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 307 (1975).
12. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973), quoted in FEDERAL RULES OF EvI-
DENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, at 134 (West 1975) [hereinafter cited as
FEDERAL RULES].
13. FED. R. Evm. 102.
14. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973), quoted in FEDERAL RULES, supra




Committee report and deleted the residual exceptions.'"
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in its own report, dis-
agreed with the "total rejection of a residual hearsay exception."'"
The Committee agreed with the House that Rule 102 could be uti-
lized to broaden and liberalize the specifically enumerated excep-
tions, but felt that it did not give trial judges sufficient discretion
to admit hearsay which could not be pigeon-holed under a recog-
nized exception. The Senate Committee felt that without a
residual exception, trial judges would be confronted with the neces-
sity of rejecting reliable and necessary evidence. The Committee
believed that "there are certain exceptional circumstances where
evidence which is found by a court to have guarantees of trustwor-
thiness equivalent to or exceeding the guarantees reflected by the
presently listed exceptions, and to have a high degree of probative-
ness and necessity could properly be admissible."'" As illustrative
of its position, the Committee cited Dallas County v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co. 19
16. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (1974), quoted in FEDERAL RULES, supra note
12, at 134.
17. Id.
18. Id., FEDERAL RULES, at 135.
19. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). Dallas County is perhaps the leading case supporting
the view that trustworthy and reliable hearsay should be admitted even if it can not be
pigeon-holed. Another oft-cited case is United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y.
1968). Barbati was convicted for passing a counterfeit $10 bill. At his trial, a barmaid and a
policeman were the chief witnesses for the prosecution. The barmaid testified that she re-
ceived the bill, called the police, and identified the defendant to the policeman. She was
unable to recognize the defendant at the trial because of the lapse of time. Her testimony at
trial, therefore, was about her out-of-court statement. The policeman testified that Barbati
was indeed the person that the barmaid pointed out. Objections were made that the testi-
mony of the barmaid and the policeman was hearsay. Since the barmaid's testimony was
indeed about an out-of-court statement and was offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement, it was hearsay. Similarly, the policeman's testimony concerned
out-of-court assertive conduct which was offered to prove the truth of the assertion and it too
was properly regarded as hearsay. Judge Weinstein admitted the testimony on the theory
that it was necessary and trustworthy. In so doing, the court in essence accepted the so-
called McCormick exception which provided that "a hearsay statement will be received if
the judge finds that the need for and the probative value of the statement render it a fair
means of proof under the circumstances." McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51
Nw. U.L. REv. 218, 219 (1956). McCormick's exception was not, at the time he wrote about
it in 1956, a new idea. Wigmore had espoused the need for the recognition of a similar catch-
all exception grounded upon necessity and reliability. See 5 WIGMORE ON EVMENCE § 1420
(3d ed. 1940).
Although Dallas County and Barbati are the two leading cases recognizing the need for
what can be called a residual exception, they are by no means the only cases so holding. See,
e.g., Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Kearney,
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
In Dallas County, a question arose concerning the cause of the
collapse of the Dallas County Courthouse clock tower in Selma, Al-
abama. County officials argued that the disaster was caused by a
bolt of lightning, and brought suit to recover on an insurance con-
tract for loss caused by fire or lightning. The insurance company
argued that a bolt of lightning could not possibly have caused the
tower to collapse and that the fault lay, rather, in structural flaws
caused partially at least by a previous fire. At trial, the defendant
sought to introduce a copy of a Selma newspaper dated June 9,
1901, fifty-six years before the collapse of the tower. The paper re-
ported a fire in the unfinished dome of the courthouse. The trial
court admitted the evidence, and was upheld on appeal. The ap-
pellate court held that:
in matters of local interest, when the fact in question is of such a
public nature it would be generally known throughout the com-
munity, and when the questioned fact occurred so long ago that
the testimony of an eye witness would probably be less trustwor-
thy than a contemporary newspaper account, a federal court...
may relax the exclusionary rules to the extent of admitting the
newspaper article in evidence. We do not characterize this news-
paper as a "business record," nor as an "ancient document," nor
as any other readily identifiable and happily tagged species. of
hearsay exception. It is admissible because it is necessary and
trustworthy. . . and its admission is within the trial judge's exer-
cise of discretion. . ..
The court of appeals was careful to make clear that this newspaper
report was not made admissible by an established exception to the
hearsay rule. The evidence was admissible because it was necessary
and trustworthy, and not because it fit neatly into any well-recog-
nized exception to the hearsay rule.
The Senate Committee noted that "[b]ecause exceptional
cases like the Dallas County case may arise in the future, the Com-
mittee has decided to reinstate a residual exception for rules 803
420 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134 (10th Cir. 1969); Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334,
200 N.E.2d 550, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1964); Perry v. Parker, 101 N.H. 295, 141 A.2d 883
(1958); Gagnon v. Pronovost, 97 N.H. 500, 92 A.2d 904 (1952). See generally 4 J. WEINSTEmN
AND M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803 (2d. ed 1979).
20. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397-98 (5th Cir.
1961).
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and 804(b)."'2 The Senate Committee did agree with the House
Committee that "an overly broad residual hearsay exception could
emasculate the hearsay rule and the recognized exceptions or viti-
ate the rationale behind codification of the rules. '2 The Senate
Committee thus reported that it had adopted a residual exception
"of much narrower scope and applicability than the Supreme
Court version," and offered the following language:
Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by
any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (i)
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (ii) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (iii) the general purposes of these rules and
the interest of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.2'
Moreover, the Committee indicated that it "intended that the
residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in
exceptional circumstances,"' ' and that no "broad license for trial
judges '2 16 was granted. The Senate adopted the Committee report,
along with the proposed language, in late 1974.27
Since there was such profound disagreement between the
House and Senate, the Rules were referred to a Conference Com-
mittee. 8 The Conference Committee went along with the Senate
concerning the desirability of a residual exception but added an
amendment providing that the use of a statement under the
residual exception had to be preceded by full and fair notification
of the adverse party.29 Ultimately, Congress adopted the Confer-
ence Committee's recommendation, and the following residual ex-




24. Id. at 3, FEDERAL RuLEs at 136.
25. Id. at 20, FEDERAL RuLEs at 135.
26. Id.
27. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
28. CONF. REP. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974), quoted in FEERAL RULES, supra
note 12, at 136.
29. Id.
19801 HEA RSA Y
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ceptions, along with the Federal Rules, took effect on July 1, 1975:30
Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the state-
ment is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through rea-
sonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be ad-
mitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.31
Thus, in order for evidence to be admitted pursuant to the
residual exceptions, five conditions must be met: (1) The propo-
nent of the evidence must give the adverse party the notice speci-
fied within the rule; (2) The statement must have circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the specified exceptions
listed in Rules 803 and 804; (3) The statement must be offered as
evidence of a material fact; (4) The statement must be more proba-
tive on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (5) The gen-
eral purposes of the Federal Rules and the interests of justice must
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTIONS BY THE FEDERAL
COURTS
Since the effective date of the Federal Rules, a plethora of
cases have construed the meaning of the residual exceptions."
30. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926, quoted in FEDERAL
RuL s, supra note 12, at 136.
31. FED. R. EvD. 803(24) and 804(b)(5). Identical wording appears in two rules by vir-
tue of the taxonomy adopted by the Federal Rules concerning hearsay exceptions-which are
divided into those which require an unavailable declarant (Rule 804) and those for which
the availability of the declarant is immaterial (Rule 803),
32. See, e.g., United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d
[Vol. 11:587
1980] HEA RSA Y 595
Thus, a substantial amount of judicial gloss has been placed upon
the residual exceptions and the time is ripe for a thorough evalua-
tion of their scope.
A. The Case For Exclusion: A Look at the Cases
The so-called exclusion cases involve the failure of the propo-
nent to provide adequate notice, the lack of equivalent circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness, and the failure of the proponent
to use reasonable efforts to secure more probative evidence. The
fact that the offered testimony was either not evidence of a mate-
rial fact or that the interests of justice would not best be served by
admission are not found to be recurring justifications for exclusion
in these cases.
1. Inadequate Notice to the Adverse Party
In unequivocal terms, *the residual exceptions state:
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party suffi-
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention
to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
1111 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Davis, 571 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1978); Frazier v. Conti-
nental Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mathis,
559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 986 (1977); NLRB v. McClure Assocs., Inc., 556 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Ward, 552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 850 (1977); United States v.
Grasso, 552 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976); United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 954 (1976); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1976); United States v. Pfeif-
fer, 539 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gomez, 529 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll
Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975); Matter of Sterling Navigation Co., 444 F. Supp. 1043
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Bailey, 439 F. Supp. 1303 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977); United States v. American Cyanamid
Co., 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D.
607 (D. Alaska 1977); Arrow-Hart, Inc. v. Covert Hills, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Ky. 1976);
United States v. laconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F.
Supp. 604 (D.Md. 1975); Workman v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 68 F.R.D. 562 (N.D. Ohio
1975); Ark-Mo Farms, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
33. FED. R. Evm. 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
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A recurring rationale for exclusion is that the proponent has failed
to adequately notify the adverse party.
In United States v. Oates,34 the defendant Paul Oates was con-
victed, after a six day jury trial, of possession of heroin with intent
to distribute and conspiracy. At his trial, the official report sheet of
the chemist who analyzed the seized substance was admitted as
evidence. On appeal, Oates contended that this report was inad-
missible hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court of
appeals agreed with Oates that the document was inadmissible and
accordingly reversed and remanded to the district court for a new
trial.
The court looked at the circumstances surrounding the admis-
sion of the report and pointed out that it was "eminently clear"
that the report was hearsay as defined by the Federal Rules.15
Moreover, the court concluded that the report was neither admissi-
ble as a public record 36 nor as a record of regularly conducted activ-
ity.37 In response to the argument made by the Government at
trial, but dropped on appeal, that the report was admissible under
the residual exceptions, the court pointed out that the requirement
of advance notice was intended to be "[r]igidly enforced. ' 3 There-
fore, any reliance on the residual exceptions "would be a mistaken
reliance." 39
34. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 65.
36. Id. at 66-68.
37. Id. at 68-80.
38. Id. at 73 n.30.
39. Id. at 72 n.30. In an extended footnote, the court viewed the legislative history and
observed that "the advance notice requirement leaves no doubt that it was the intention of
Congress that the requirement be read strictly." Id. at 73 n.30. Representative Hungate, a
Conference Committee member, stated:
The party requesting the court to make the statement under this provision must
notify the adverse party of this fact, and the notice must be given sufficiently in
advance of trial and hearing to provide any adverse party a fair opportunity to
object or contest the use of the statement.
Id. Representative Dennis, another member of the Conference Committee stated:
We took this [hearsay exception] out completely, and I would like to have left it
out, frankly. . . What the Senators did was put it back in and then they added
this language about (A), (B), (C) that the gentleman from California (Mr. Daniel-
son) referred to, and said that this principle would apply only where the statement
is offered as evidence of a material fact, where it is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than anything else the proponent can procure, and, again, where
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served.
We still did not like it very well, so we then wrote in the conference a provi-
sion which said that even so, one cannot do it, even with all of this language,
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In similar fashion, the court in United States v. Davis"0 re-
versed a conviction of the defendant, a previously convicted felon,
for receiving a firearm through interstate commerce under a statute
prohibiting such receipt by convicted felons. At trial, the district
court admitted a document prepared by an agent of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms that helped establish that the fire-
arms traveled through interstate commerce. On appeal, the defen-
dant argued that the document was inadmissible hearsay. The
court of appeals agreed with the defendant and accordingly re-
versed and remanded for a new trial. As in Oates, the court first
determined that the document was hearsay and that it was not ad-
missible under any specific exception. The court observed that the
"only other hearsay exception conceivably applicable is that found
in Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and its counterpart Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(5)." ' 41 After quoting the residual exceptions, the court
pointed out that "the record discloses that the Government made
no attempt to invoke the exception by giving the defense the re-
quired advance notice of the hearsay evidence to be offered at
trial."142 Thus, the document could not be admitted under the
residual exceptions.
2. Lack of Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of
Trustworthiness
Another recurring rationale for exclusion is that the proponent
failed to show that the offered evidence possesses "equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," as required by the
residual exceptions. In United States v. Gonzalez,'3 the defendant
which includes the Court's language and the Senate's language, without giving the
other side notice before trial so that counsel knows such an attempt is going to be
made, and he can get ready for it.
Id. Since it was "difficult to imagine anyone more qualified to comment" (Id. at 70 n.26.)
than Representatives Hungate, and since "Representative Dennis' remarks are also entitled
to great weight" (Id. at 71 n.28.), the Congressional intent was clear: "undeviating adher-
ence to the requirement that notice be given in advance of trial" (Id. at 73 n.30) was what
Congress desired. The Second Circuit reaffirmed its intention to construe the notice require-
ment rigorously in United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1978). In Ruffin, the court,
citing Oates at length, pointed out that the trial court erred in admitting documents under
the residual exception absent advance notice.
40. 571 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1978).
41. Id. at 1360 n.11.
42. Id.
43. 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
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was convicted of possession of over a ton of marijuana in connec-
tion with a marijuana importation scheme. At his trial, the prose-
cution called Rogelio Guerrero to the stand. Guerrero refused to
testify, even though he had already been convicted for his role in
the marijuana importation caper and had been granted immunity.
The trial court cited him for contempt, concluded that he was un-
available as a witness, and thereupon permitted the prosecution to
introduce his grand jury testimony into evidence. That testimony
identified the defendant Gonzalez as the man who had employed
Guerrero to drive the truck involved in the scheme.
In reversing Gonzalez' conviction, the court of appeals first
found that Guerrero's testimony was not admissible as a statement
against interest under Rule 804(b)(3) because it did not meet the
"against interest" guarantee of reliability." It then analyzed the
admissibility of Guerrero's grand jury testimony under the residual
exception of Rule 804(b)(5). The court concluded that the state-
ment failed "to pass the test of 'having equivalent guarantees of
trustworthiness,' ",95 and was therefore inadmissible under the
residual exception. As indicia of the lack of requisite trustworthi-
ness, the court pointed out that: (1) Guerrero was under pressure
at the grand jury hearing to answer, whether his answers were true
or not; (2) The questions asked were leading and thus may have
distorted Guerrero's testimony; (3) The fact that Guerrero was
under oath was not significant in view of the prosecutor's threats
that if Guerrero remained silent he could be given repeated six
month contempt citations; (4) Guerrero feared that if he told the
truth about who hired him, members of his family might be
harmed, and this provided some incentive not to tell the truth; and
(5) His testimony was not subject to cross-examination.4 1
In United States v. Hoyos,47 the defendant was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute methaqualone tablets, conspir-
acy to possess with intent to distribute, and distribution of the tab-
lets. The defendant Hoyos' convictions resulted from the sale of
methaqualone tablets to an undercover agent. At trial, the defense
called Mrs. Cesar Castro to testify concerning a conversation she
had with her husband in which her husband made statements
44. Id. at 1273.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 573 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1978).
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tending to exculpate Hoyos. Cesar Castro did not appear although
he was subpoenaed by Hoyos to testify. The court sustained the
Government's objection to Mrs. Castro's testimony on the ground
that it was hearsay. Hoyos claimed that the trial court prejudi-
cially erred when it excluded the testimony of Castro's wife con-
cerning the conversation she had with her husband. Hoyos admit-
ted that the offered testimony was hearsay but argued that it fell
within either Rule 804(b)(3) or 804(b)(5).
On appeal, the court of appeals first considered whether the
testimony should have been admitted as a statement against inter-
est under Rule 804(b)(3). After quoting the rule, and stressing the
fact that such statements were admissible only when corroborating
circumstances clearly indicated trustworthiness, the court con-
cluded that it was "satisfied that the trial court here properly exer-
cised its discretion in excluding the offered testimony.' 8 The court
also rejected Hoyos' claim that Rule 804(b)(5) was available as a
ground for admission of the offered testimony. The court dispensed
with that argument entirely by stating: "By its plain language, the
quoted section requires 'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.' For the same reasons that the trial court properly
refused the admission of the testimony under Rule 804(b)(3), it
also ruled correctly in refusing to admit the testimony under Rule
804(b)(5). ' ',
3. Failure to Use Reasonable Efforts to Secure More Probative
Evidence
Some courts have seized upon the failure of the proponent to
use reasonable efforts to secure more probative evidence as a ratio-
nale for exclusion. In United States v. Mathis, " the defendant was
convicted of violating a federal statute making it a crime to receive
a stolen firearm. At trial, the Government called Wanda McPeters
Mathis, the putative wife of the defendant, to testify against him.
A hearing was conducted to determine whether Mrs. Mathis pos-
sessed the spousal privilege not to testify against her husband. The
48. Id. at 1115.
49. Id. at 1116. A remarkably similar analysis was used in Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F.
Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1975). In Lowery, the court concluded that a statement which did not
qualify as a statement against interest could not be admitted under the residual exception.
Id. at 608. See also, NLRB v. McClure Assocs., Inc., 556 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1977).
50. 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977).
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trial judge decided that the marriage was a sham and that the
spousal privilege was technically not available. The trial judge per-
mitted the Government to introduce into evidence statements
made by Mrs. Mathis to Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents
prior to trial, and Mrs. Mathis did not testify. On appeal, the de-
fendant argued that the court prejudicially erred in admitting Mrs.
Mathis' statements. The Government, in response, argued that her
statements were admissible under the residual exceptions to the
hearsay rule. The court concluded that the statements were im-
properly admitted and reversed on that basis."
The court first noted that the statements were hearsay,5 2 and
that Rule 804(b)(5) was inapposite because Mrs. Mathis was
"available," enjoying no valid privilege allowing her to avoid tak-
ing the stand5 3 The court then stated the conditions that had to be
met before evidence could be admitted pursuant to the Rule
803(24) exception. 4 Since the live testimony of the available Mrs.
Mathis would have been of more probative value than her reported
statements, the hearsay was improperly admitted.5 In short, the
statement did not qualify because it was not, as the rule requires,
more probative than other evidence that could have been procured
through reasonable efforts: "The live testimony of the available
witness, whose demeanor the jury would have been able to observe
and whose testimony would have been subject to cross-examina-
tion, would have been of more probative value in establishing the
truth than the bare statements transcribed by the ATF agents. 56
Similarly, in Council Commerce Corp. v. Sterling Navigation
Co.,57 plaintiff Council Commerce Corporation (Council), a secured
creditor, appealed from an order of a bankruptcy judge who had
denied the relief sought against the bankrupt Sterling Navigation
Co. (Sterling). At the bankruptcy trial, Council unsuccessfully
sought to admit a transcript of testimony of a Sterling official given
in the course of a non-adversary pretrial hearing as either former
51. Id. at 297.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 298.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court added that "'the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
were not served by the admission of the statements into evidence." Id. at 299. It appears
however, that the gist of the holding is that the statements were inadmissible because they
were not the most probative evidence the Government could procure.
57. 444 F. Supp. 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) or as falling within the residual ex-
ception of Rule 804(b)(5). The court affirmed the bankruptcy
judge's refusal to admit the testimony. It found the transcript in-
admissible under Rule 804(b)(1) because of the lack of similar mo-
tive to develop testimony. 58 In regard to the residual exception,
the court found that Council had failed to demonstrate that the
evidence was "'more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts.' "" The court felt that Council offered the tran-
script without making a reasonable effort to obtain other evidence.
Thus, the court concluded that the interests of justice would not
be served by admitting the evidence!10 The "requisite necessity was
lacking"'" because Council made no effort to depose or produce
others who might have been able to offer evidence more probative
than that of the now unavailable Sterling official.2
B. The Case For Admission: Strangulating Hearsay
In a number of cases where evidence is admitted under the
residual exceptions, the courts have sidestepped the advance notice
requirement and have given little more than lip service to the other
requirements of the rules. This perhaps is symptomatic of the judi-
cial proclivity to admit evidence fairly regarded as necessary and
reliable, technical requirements to the contrary notwithstanding.
1. Advance Notice Requirement
In sharp contrast to the strict enforcement of the notice re-
quirement in cases discussed above,63 there is a distinct line of
cases that virtually ignore the requirement. In United States v.
Iaconetti,64 the defendant, Harry laconetti, was found guilty of
soliciting and accepting a bribe and attempting to extort money.
laconetti was a federal government contract inspector. The Govern-
ment's chief witness, Mr. Lioi, an officer of a corporation seeking a
58. Id. at 1046.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1047.
61. Id. at 1046.
62. Id. Similarly, in Workman v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 68 F.R.D. 562 .(N.D. Ohio
1975), the court found inadmissible the written statement of an eyewitness, deceased by the
time of trial, in light of the fact that other eyewitnesses were available.
63. See notes 33-42 supra, and accompanying text.
64. 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976).
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government contract, testified that laconetti solicited a bribe and
attempted to extort money. As a defense, aconetti testified to the
effect that he was only joking with Mr. Lioi. To rebut laconetti's
testimony, the Government called Lioi's partner, Mr. Goldman,
and the corporation's attorney, Mr. Stern. Stern testified concern-
ing conversations he had with Lioi, which tended to substantiate
Lioi's version. laconetti objected to Stem's testimony on the
ground that it was inadmissible hearsay. The court held that the
testimony of Stern was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)"5 as
consistent testimony to rebut a charge of recent fabrication. Addi-
tionally, the court held that Stem's testimony was admissible as an
admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(C). 61 Finally, the court held it ad-
missible under the residual exception of Rule 803(24). Concerning
the residual exception, the court pointed out that although notice
was not given until midway through the defendant's testimony
(five days before Stern was called), it was nonetheless admissible.
Judge Weinstein concluded:
Although notice was not given in advance of trial, as required
by the language of the Rule, allowance must be made for situa-
tions like this in which the need did not become apparent until
after the trial had commenced. Since it was not the proponent's
fault that notice could only be given after the trial began, and
since the defendant was not prejudiced by the mid-trial notice,
the evidence was properly admitted under Rule 803(24).2
Moreover, Judge Weinstein pointed out, laconetti "did not request
a continuance or make any reference to an inability to prepare ade-
quately to meet the testimony of the new witnesses." 9
On appeal, the court of appeals0 specifically agreed that
Stem's testimony was properly admitted pursuant to Rule
803(24)." As far as the lack of advance notice was concerned, the
court observed:
Of course the defendant was not given notice prior to trial, of
65. Id. at 558.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 559-60.
68. Id. at 560.
69. Id. at 559-60.
70. 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 577.
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the Government's intention to offer the rebuttal testimony ...
While strict compliance with the rule is thus lacking, we agree
with Judge Weinstein that the defendant was given sufficient no-
tice here, and that some latitude must be permitted in situations
like this in which the need does not become apparent until after
the trial has commenced. The fact that defendant did not request
a continuance or in any way claim that he was unable adequately
to prepare to meet the rebuttal testimony further militates
against a finding that he was prejudiced by it .... 1,
The so-called Iaconetti approach has been adopted by a num-
ber of courts and has been used to largely vitiate the advance no-
tice requirement.13
2. Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness
Two 1978 Fourth Circuit cases, United States v. West" and
United States v. Garner,5 when compared with the cases discussed
above in which equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness were found lacking," illustrate a vast difference in approach
72. Id. at 578.
73. In an extended footnote in laconetti, the court looked at the legislative history,
observed that the notice requirement was a "compromise measure," and intoned:
Our holding should in no way be construed as in general approving the waiver
of Rule 803(24)'s notice requirements. Pre-trial notice should clearly be given if at
all possible, and only in those situations where requiring pre-trial notice is wholly
impracticable, as here, should flexibility be accorded.
540 F.2d at 578 n.6. The warning of footnote 6 has been largely ignored. In United States v.
Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted the approach to-
wards the advance notice requirement articulated by Judge Weinstein and the Second Cir-
cuit, quoting Iaconetti at length, but not mentioning or referring to footnote 6, which is
appropriately viewed as restricting the court's ability to dispense with advance notice as a
requirement. In United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit
took the ball it had picked up in Leslie and ran with it, admitting an affidavit under the
residual exception without at all mentioning the lack of advance notice, thus perhaps doing
away with it sub silentio.
In United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), the Eighth Circuit expressly
adopted the Iaconetti approach towards the advance notice requirement without mentioning
the limitation of footnote 6. Id. at 1355. See also United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777 (8th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Bailey for proposi-
tion that a brief recess meets the requirement); Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet,
Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bailey, 439 F. Supp. 1303 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (although pre-trial notice was not afforded, the purpose of the requirement was met by
allowing the defendant a three day recess to prepare to respond to the evidence).
74. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
75. 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978).
76. See notes 43-49 supra, and accompanying text.
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to the "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
criterion for the residual exceptions.
In West, the defendants were convicted of distributing heroin
and possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Grand jury testi-
mony of a Michael Victor Brown, who was dead by the time of the
trial, was admitted against the defendants pursuant to the residual
exception of Rule 804. The facts revealed that Brown had volun-
teered to work with the Drug Enforcement Agency while in jail on a
drug charge and had played a crucial role in making purchases
from the defendants while under government surveillance.
The defendants maintained on appeal that the district judge
prejudicially erred in admitting Brown's grand jury testimony
under the residual exception contained in Rule 804. They focused
their assignment of error upon the requirement that the statement
have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,"
and contended that Brown's testimony at the grand jury was not
trustworthy since Brown could not be cross-examined and did, af-
ter all, have a criminal record of his own.
The court found "very exceptional circumstances providing
substantial guarantees of trustworthiness of Brown's grand jury tes-
timony probably exceeding by far the substantial guarantees of
trustworthiness of some of the other § 804(b) hearsay exceptions.""
Among these exceptional circumstances, the court found "the most
impressive assurance of trustworthiness" to be the extensive cor-
roboration provided by the government agents.7 8 Although Brown
was not subject to cross-examination, the corroboration made the
testimony trustworthy. The corroborative circumstances provided
"a degree of trustworthiness probably substantially exceeding that
inherent in dying declarations, statements against interest, and
statements of personal or family history, all of which are routinely
admitted under § 804(b)(2), (3) and (4)."79 Since the agents were
witnesses and subject to cross-examination, the inability to cross-
examine Brown was "of considerable less significance than in those
cases involving statement against interest, statements of family
history, or dying declarations." ' 0 It was unnecessary to determine
whether the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness were
77. United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1135 (4th Cir. 1978).
78. Id. at 1135.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1135-36.
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equivalent to those which arise under the former testimony excep-
tion of Rule 804(b)(1) since "the equivalent guarantee of trust-
worthiness requirement of § 804(b)(5) is met if there is equivalency
of any one of the preceding § 804(b) exceptions.""' The court con-
cluded that Brown's testimony was as reliable as the typically
admitted exceptions of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Rule 804(b).81
In Garner, the defendants were convicted of a series of drug-
related offenses involving the alleged importation of heroin. At
trial, the Government called Warren Robinson as a witness. Robin-
son was also involved in the importation scheme but had entered
into a plea agreement, the terms of which required him to testify at
a grand jury and in any ensuing criminal proceedings. By the time
of trial, Robinson had already appeared before a grand jury. At
trial, however, he refused to testify concerning the drug importa-
tion scheme, and the trial court admitted his grand jury testimony.
The defendants appealed, contending that the admission of the
grand jury testimony was prejudicial error.
Relying heavily upon West, the court upheld the admission of
the grand jury testimony, finding "strong indicators of reliabil-
ity. 8 3 Chief among these indicators was evidence corroborating
Robinson's grand jury testimony. In short, the Garner court effec-
tively held that the residual exception permits the admission of
probative evidence which is corroborated by other evidence."4
3. Other Requirements
A number of cases admitting evidence under the residual ex-
ception deal with the remaining requirements of the residual ex-
ception: that the proferred evidence be evidence of a material fact;
that it be more probative than other evidence that can be procured
through reasonable efforts; and that the interests of justice be
81. Id. at 1136.
82. Id.
83. United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir. 1978).
84. This is the conclusion critically drawn by Weinstein. 4 J. WEINSTEIN AND M. BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804(b)(5) [01], at 129 (2d ed. 1979). In United States v. Carlson
547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), which is cited in both Garner and West, the Eighth Circuit
used Rule 804(b)(5) to admit the grand jury testimony of a reluctant witness. See also
United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d
777 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978); United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d
309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977); United States v. Ward, 552 F.2d 1080 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 850 (1977); United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668 (1976);
United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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served by admission. For the most part, analysis of these require-
ments in the cases admitting the evidence is perfunctory. United
States v. Carlsons5 and Keyes v. School District Number 111 are
illustrative.
In Carlson, the defendants Carlson, Hostad, and Dahl were
convicted of conspiring to distribute, distributing, and possessing
cocaine. At trial, the court admitted the grand jury testimony of
James Tindall, which contained information indicating Carlson
had been involved in a cocaine deal with him. The court admitted
this testimony after Tindall was called as a witness but refused to
testify, apparently fearing reprisals from Carlson. Tindall was cited
for contempt. The court found Tindall unavailable and admitted
the grand jury testimony pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5). On appeal of
Hostad and Carlson, the court of appeals affirmed.
The court found that Tindall was in fact unavailable, 7 and
proceeded to determine if Tindall's grand jury testimony possessed
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.""8 The
court found "a strong indication of reliability in Tindall's testi-
mony"89 because his grand jury testimony was given under oath, it
related facts about which Tindall possessed first-hand knowledge,
and because he had never recanted or otherwise cast doubt upon
it.1 Moreover, it was necessary since no one else was available to
testify concerning it."' The court found that Tindall's grand jury
testimony was offered as evidence of a material fact since it was
"relevant and material in that it showed intent, knowledge, a com-
mon plan or scheme and the absence of mistake or accident."" An-
alyzing the residual exception's check list, the court next found
that the statement was more probative than any other evidence
that could be procured through reasonable efforts since "there is no
indication in the record that the Government could have obtained
the same or similar evidence . . . from another source. '9 3 In a sen-
tence, the court dispensed with the requirement that the interests
85. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
86. 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977).
87. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353-54 (8th Cir. 1976).





93. Id. at 1355.
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of justice be best seived by admission, observing: "To deprive the
jury of the substance of this testimony merely because Carlson
caused Tindall not to testify at trial would be antithetical to the
truth-seeking function of our judicial system and would not serve
the interests of justice.""4 Finally, the court found that the failure
to give formal pretrial notice was excusable 5 and concluded by af-
firming the district court's admission of Tindall's grand jury
testimony."
In a different context, but in very similar fashion, the trial
court in Keyes admitted hearsay testimony under the residual ex-
ception of Rule 803. In Keyes, the plaintiffs sought fees, costs, and
expenses after prevailing in a school desegregation case. The court
admitted affidavits from lawyers in the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund (LDF) cataloging time expended on the case although the af-
fidavits were clearly not admissible under the federal "shopbook"
rule of 803(6).
On appeal, after restating the elements of the residual excep-
tion, but curiously omitting the requirement that there be
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," the
court of appeals held that:
All the requirements of Rule 803(24) are met. The evidence is of-
fered on a material fact, the evidence is the best available, de-
fendants had adequate notice well in advance of the hearings, and
the interest of justice are served by their admission. There is no
question that LDF attorneys spent a considerable amount of time
on the Keyes litigation. To fail to compensate them would not be
in the interests of justice in this case, or within the interest and
intent of the civil rights fee award statutes. Therefore, we accept
the affidavits of the LDF attorneys as admissible evidence. 7
94. Id.
95. See note 73 supra, and accompanying text.
96. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976).
97. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 411 (D. Colo. 1977). For somewhat
similar short and sweet treatment of some of the requirements of the residual exception,
resulting in admission of hearsay under the catch-all exceptions, see United States v. Wil-
liams, 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668
(8th Cir. 1976); Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Bailey, 439 F. Supp. 1303 (W.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977); Ark-Mo Farms, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384
(Ct. Cl. 1976).
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V. CONCLUSION
The courts continue to be widely divided in their approach to
the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule. This is to be expected
with a newly stated rule. The issue now becomes the construction
that should emerge in light of the legislative history.
The advance notice requirement is so clearly stated that to
sidestep it is to flirt with lawlessness. The decisions that adhere to
the requirement are clearly more consistent with the rule and the
legislative history. One might question the necessity for such a re-
quirement; it is quite another thing, however, to virtually ignore its
presence. It would appear that the farthest a court could honestly
go, consistent with the requirement and its purposes, would be to
grant a continuance to permit the adversary to prepare against the
proferred evidence." Thus, a relatively hard line on the advance
notice requirement is appropriate.
On the other hand, the remaining requirements-that the of-
fered evidence possess "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness," that it be evidence of a material fact, that it be
more probative than other evidence which can reasonably be pro-
cured, and that the general purposes of the rules and the interests
of justice best be served by admission-should be liberally con-
strued. First, the "equivalency" requirement would not be difficult
to meet, given the well-recognized fact of the unreliability of much
of the traditionally admitted hearsay." Since simple equivalency is
all that is required, it should not be too difficult for a proponent to
show that the proferred piece of evidence is as reliable as one of the
less reliable specific exceptions. The requirement that evidence be
of a material fact is redundant and unnecessary, because if not ma-
terial, the evidence would not be relevant and would thus be inad-
missible under Rules 401 and 402. What this requirement most
likely means is that the residual exception is not a proper vehicle
98. See, e.g., cases discussed in note 73 supra.
99. The point has been made by many commentators that often the traditional hear-
say rule, along with its exceptions, operates to exclude the more reliable and admit the less
reliable evidence. In short, much evidence routinely admitted under a recognized exception
is simply not too trustworthy. See, e.g., E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
EVIDENcE LAW 229 (5th ed. 1976); J. PRINCE, PICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 206 (10th ed. 1973);
C. MCCORMACK, McCORMACK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 244-327 (2d ed. E.
Cleary ed. 1972); Davis, Evidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34
MINN. L. REv. 581 (1950).
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for gaining admission of trivial or collateral items.'°0 Thus, it is not
a major obstacle to admission. The requirement that the offered
statement be more probative than other evidence that can be pro-
cured through reasonable efforts is aimed at ensuring that the ex-
ception is used only when reasonably necessary. In this regard, the
opponent should bear the burden of showing that the same or simi-
lar evidence could have been obtained from another source by rea-
sonable efforts.'01 Finally, the requirement that the general pur-
poses of the rules and the interests of justice best be served by
admission must be construed liberally. The legislative history of
the rules, though admittedly reflecting compromise, manifests a
clear intent that all the rules be construed to promote "growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."'' 02 Since rigid
unyielding application of the hearsay rules would ultimately oper-
ate to reject evidence that is reliable and trustworthy, it is destruc-
tive of the truth-seeking process.
In summary, the residual exceptions can and should eventu-
ally provide the statutory support for a broad and sweeping excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. Ultimately, with the guidance provided by
the residual exceptions and the cases construing them, the dual
ends that the truth be ascertained and that proceedings be fairly
determined will be realized. In short, "a hearsay statement will be
received if the judge finds that the need for and the probative value
of the statement render it a fair means of proof under the circum-
stances.' ' 0 3 Hearsay, then, will have been successfully triangulated,
strangulated and left to twist slowly, slowly in the wind-a harsh
result, but perhaps the only way to deal with a menace the magni-
tude of the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
100. This observation was made with convincing clarity by Judge Weinstein in United
States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (mem.).
101. This is the approach taken in United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th
Cir. 1976).
102. FED. R. EVID. 102. The commentators are pretty much in agreement that the pre-
vailing intent of the Federal hearsay-related rules is to make Federal hearsay practice less
onerous. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 239 (1978); Evans, Article Eight of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: The Hearsay Rule, 8 VAL. U.L. REv. 261 (1974); Stewart, Perception,
Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 1970 UTAH L. Rgv. 1; Comment, A Practitioner's Guide to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 10 U. RzcH. L. REv. 169 (1975).
103. McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 218, 219 (1956).
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